the sds phenomenon

Basically S.D.S. politics stem from disaffection and a moral outrage toward the quality of life and the policies of America. While this is a desirable political foundation, it represents in itself, a poor basisfor developing political program. Once the nation became inured to moral confrontation, more sophisticated efforts were demanded of us. As of yet the student part of the movement has not met this demand with a new level of political programming.

A brief look at the responses to our Vietnam protests lends a better understanding of their current inadequacy.

When we decided at the Christmas National Council meeting in the winter of 1964 to stage the first March on Washington, there was little visible dissent to the war. At that time Johnson's consensus was working handsomely and we could have had every expectation that dissent would have been as formless as that toward the Korean war. Yet the March on Washington and the other marches, plus the strength of our intellectual critique demonstrated in a strong manner that the consensus was a veneer covering reasoned dissent. The march, which at that time was the largest peace march in Ameri-

can history forced some intellectuals and academics to examine this nation's Southeast Asian policy. The marches were a good lever to win recognition that the Vietnam war was a matter for debate.

After the Teach-in movement and the first International Days of Protest, the communications media had stereotyped and blunted the impact of marches so that they were no longer a startling or disruptive form of protest. Public demonstrations were eventually made so unnewsworthy that Buddhists burning themselves in the ultimate plea to American humanity received only passing attention. The disruptive impact of public witness had been lost.

But S.D.S. groups continued to affiliate with the numerous marches, fasts, and rallies that were held; few imaginative programs were instituted. Yet to seriously oppose the war effort now meant that groups had to reach a broader group of people, disrupt the orderly functioning of the war-making mechanism, or attempt to establish bases of power to oppose the war. The two rather new attempts were aimed at developing a broader anti-war constituency. These were the S.D.S.

counter draft deferment exams, and the running of peace candidates who would use their candidacy to campaign on radical issues and crystallize through their vote an expression of anti-war sentiment.

These were the exceptions, however. Most groups that I've seen in the last six months continued in the march or public witness syndrome. For instance in Torrence, California a Dow Chemical plant received a government contract to produce napalm and chapters in the Los Angeles area decided to protest. On a hot Saturday afternoon more than 150 picketers appeared and marched in front of the plant's outer fence for two hours. The best of the signs carried was "Death Begins at Dow". On the opposite side of the highway were 75 highway partolmen to protect the refinery from us (?). After two hours picketing, we withdrew to an adjacent field for a rally. Here the Torrence Police Chief told us that according to a Torrence ordinance, we could not leaflet in downtown Torrence without a permit from the City Council.

There was a short debate with the decision to not get people arrested that day to test

a civil liberties issue because we had not made legal preparation. There were two speakers, myself and a pacifist organizer. His remarks expressed a rather simple moral outrage. "We're here because we demand President Johnson admit his mistake in the illegal war in Vietnam." After the rally most everyone went home feeling they had done their part against the war for the week.

But what had been done? No striking visual image was created so that the passing motorists realized the economic health of their community rested on the continued incineration of villages and people in Vietnam. In fact most motorists drove by struck by the beatnik/communist image that we hadn't been imaginative enough to transcend. No workers in the plant went through a personal moral confrontation about their livelihood being bound to war production. We didn't educate the townspeople, the passing motorists or the cops about the war. We didn't interfere with the production of the plant. We didn't even gear the demonstration to deepen the analysis of the demonstrators. The net effect was that same (continued on page 3)

administration crackdown

by Jim Wallihan, Indiana University SDS

In a pre-election effort to bolster sagging support for his Administration and his war, President Johnson has planned a series of weekend tours throughout the country. The first of these trips, through Indiana, Kentucky, and Illinois, began on Saturday, July 23, and was gauged to create the illusion of unanimous support, interestingly enough, in a section where peace activity has been somewhat less visible than on the two coasts.

On three days notice, peace groups along the presidential route coordinated a series of "welcoming committees" to greet the President at major stops. One purpose of these actions was to counter the political strategy of the tour by demonstrating broad and visible opposition to the war.

In preparation for the first stop, in Indianapolis, LBJ's rightwing friend Eugene Pulliam, publisher of the Indianapolis Star, printed what was essentially an open call for the American Legion and all war-supporters to turn out en masse. The peace demonstration, of which they had gotten word, was held out as bait.

On Saturday, Indiana University SDS and Bloomington Committee to End the War turned out around 400 people to greet Johnson at Indianapolis. Support came from local SDSers, Antioch SDS people, including Paul Millman and Art Rosenstein, Dayton and Cincinnatti, and, as things developed, from fencesitters and bystanders. The demonstration was the largest ever assembled in Indianapolis.

In Louisville, Ky. and Jeffersonville, Ind. that evening, the Louisville Peace and Freedom Center brought out 40 people, a decent turnout for the Louisville movement, which is just forming. One sign read, "Welcome President Goldwater."

Events in Indianapolis developed into a major travesty of civil liberties, resulting in 29 arrests. Press Secretary Bill Moyers that day said that the President felt that "dissident elements" should not be permitted to interfere with the majority and should be "deemphasized." Secret Servicemen, apparently acting on this suggestion, requested local police to clear all people carrying "derogatory" signs from areas where they would be visible to the President, the media, or the bulk of the crowd of about 40,000, many of whom were waving pro-war, pro-Johnson, and Hi-Luci sians.

The operation is best described as one in which the officials involved acted as extensions of Johnson's ego. They protected the President from seeing the dissent he fears so much ferreting out and arresting those who looked like they might even want to demonstrate. As people began to arrive an hour before Johnson's speech, police began making arrests on charges so false that even a pro-war, pro-escalation local television station has totally denounced the operation

as a gross violation of civil liberties.

Although there were several, more fla-

this: anyone carrying a sign mentioning Hartke, Fulbright, Kennedy, or peace was asked to hand over his sign. If they so much as asked "Why?", they were arrested. One police captain described the signs as subversive. A sergeant suggested that "it wouldn't be a bad idea to bring out the fire hoses on them."

Following are some of the incidents which occurred:

Susan Melvin of Bloomington was asked
by police to drop her picket and did so. As
she walked away she was arrested for littering.

2. David Kelly, Chairman of Indiana University SDS, was standing with several signs, held together in such a way that the messages could not be seen. A cop turned one over to see if it was a peace picket and shortly after returned to arrest Kelly.

3. Several people, some of whom had not even received signs, were arrested while standing on the lawn of Christ Church, with the permission of the pastor.

4. A Vista worker was arrested while attempting to help a five-year-old boy whose face had been chewed by a police dog.

5. Professor James Dinsmoor, who ran as a peace candidate for Congress in May, was arrested and roughed up on the way to the paddy wagon.

6. A one-legged veteran had his artificial leg kicked off and his stump bruised by police. As far as anyone can tell, there was no provocation for any of the arrests. Demonstrators and by standers who indicated any concern over the arrests were lumped together as threats to Johnson's sensitivity and to the crumbling image of unanimous support for the war in the Midwest.

The twenty-nine were charged with such offenses as "creating a disturbance at a public gathering", "littering", "disturbing a peaceful assembly", and "interfering with an officer", and bail was set at \$100 for people living outside the county. It was clear to all who observed the arrests that the only instances of disturbance, interference, or littering were created by the police and the Secret Service.

In court on the following Monday, the State refused to prosecute the twenty-nine, who are being defended by lawyers from the Indiana Civil Liberties Union. The city then rearrested, re-fingerprinted, and re-booked all but one or two of the twenty-nine and changed the charges. In cases where demonstrators had been charged with violations of state laws, they are now charged with violations of city ordinances. In many instances, the new charges bear little resemblance to the old ones. The cases have now been continued and taken under advisement until August 4th.

Reaction to the action has appeared to backfire, with support for the demonstrators' case developing in unexpected quarters. The arrests were obviously political and Indianapolis is now rife with rumors of splits



an internal newspaper of students for a democratic society 1608 w. madison, rm. 206

chicago, ill. 60612

Vol. 1, No. 28

let the people decide

July 29, 1966

last will and testament

This issue of NLN will be my last issue as editor. If people have been reading the NAC minutes, they will have learned that I am leaving the national staff. In light of the fact that I was elected Assistant National Secretary at the last NC with the understanding that I would stay on staff until the convention, this may seem to be irresponsible. I would like to state my reasons for leaving.

When I came to work for the NO, it was due to an accident. I did not plan to stay for longer than six weeks at the most. I felt at the end of that period that until the staff situation in the office could be improved in terms of the functioning of the NO as an office, I should stay. I would set time limits at the end of which I would want to leave. however, everytime I would start to think about leaving there would seem to be a new crisis which I would feel I should stay and help out in for a while. The last and longest lasting of these crises came when I became editor of NLN. I had no experience which should qualify me to be the editor of a newspaper, and several people have indicated that they would like to become editor who did have such experience. It is precisely because NLN is NOT a newspaper but a internal newsletter of SDS, that I retained the job of editor. It is felt by the NAC that the qualifications of the editor of NLN should fall into three prioritised groupings, and that the least important of these qualifications is editorial

First, the editor of NLN MUST be be a person tolerant toward the viewpoints of other members of SDS with whom he politically disagrees. This means that the editor must be a person who will print viewpoints which he disagrees with, without trying to change the meaning of what was said, and without falling victim to the urge to reply to everything with which he disagrees. Second, the editor of NLN should have experience in SDS at more than the chapter level. This means that the editor should be someone who knows many people of divergent viewpoints and geographic origin within the organization. Third, it would be nice if the editor had previous editorial experience. This means that we would prefer someone who has the first two qualifications plus some experience in putting-out a newspaper, but whoever is editor must have those first two no previous editorial experience. When I became convinced that Greg Calvert had the first two qualifications for editor I announced that I wished to leave. The reasons I gave are very real reasons for leaving. For the benefit of those of you who have never worked in the NO (almost all of you) I will list those reasons

There are three types of people who want to work in the NO. First there are the people who should not work in an office situation; but, because of some kind of mythical belief in the NO as an important political place, they feel that they should work in the NO. These are people who have been important in their chapters and may be very competent people in many situations but are totally incompetent when it becomes necessary for them to work in an office and do large amounts of boring paperwork for 8-12 hours every day of the week. Most of these people leave as soon as they discover that they cannot do the job which they are expected to do. In large part they are the cause of the rapid turnover of office staff. Second, there are the people who are capable of working in any office and who do the same amount of work that they would do if they were working in any other office. Third, there are the super-efficient bureaucrats. I place myself in this third group. The problem with being a super-efficient is that while you can do more in an 8-hour day office than most people do in two such days, you are so good at doing things that you end up working a 16 hour day in order to get all the things done which you feel have to get done. This is demoralizing in many ways. First, it completely destroys you as anything except an automaton. Second, because you work so hard you feel very bitter because the other staff members don't feel the same way, or, if some of the other staff members try to follow your example and they are not capable of doing the same amounts of work that you can, then they become demoralized and that makes you more demoralized. Third, you begin to become very upset about SDS and the membership because you feel that more people should be doing the hard work. And last, people begin to depend on you and you start to feel that you are indispensible. can think of nothing in an organization such as SDS more demoralizing than feeling

the sds phenomenon

Basically S.D.S. politics stem from disaffection and a moral outrage toward the quality of life and the policies of America. While this is a desirable political foundation, it represents in itself, a poorbasis for developing political program. Once the nation became inured to moral confrontation, more sophisticated efforts were demanded of us. As of yet the student part of the movement has not met this demand with a new level of political programming.

A brief look at the responses to our Vietnam protests lends a better understanding of their current inadequacy.

When we decided at the Christmas National Council meeting in the winter of 1964 to stage the first March on Washington, there was little visible dissent to the war. At that time Johnson's consensus was working handsomely and we could have had every expectation that dissent would have been as formless as that toward the Korean war. Yet the March on Washington and the other marches, plus the strength of our intellectual critique demonstrated in a strong manner that the consensus was a veneer covering reasoned dissent. The march, which at that time was the largest peace march in American history forced some intellectuals and academics to examine this nation's Southeast Asian policy. The marches were a good lever to win recognition that the Vietnam war was

After the Teach-in movement and the first International Days of Protest, the communications media had stereotyped and blunted the impact of marches so that they were no longer a startling or disruptive form of protest. Public demonstrations were eventually made so unnewsworthy that Buddhists burning themselves in the ultimate plea to American humanity received only passing attention. The disruptive impact of public witness had been lost.

But S.D.S. groups continued to affiliate with the numerous marches, fasts, and rallies that were held; few imaginative programs were instituted. Yet to seriously oppose the war effort now meant that groups had to reach a broader group of people, disrupt the orderly functioning of the war-making mechanism, or attempt to establish bases of power to oppose the war. The two rather new attempts were aimed at developing a broader anti-war constituency. These were the S.D.S.

counter draft deferment exams, and the running of peace candidates who would use their candidacy to campaign on radical issues and crystallize through their vote an expression of anti-war sentiment.

These were the exceptions, however. Most groups that I've seen in the last six months continued in the march or public witness syndrome. For instance in Torrence, California a Dow Chemical plant received a government contract to produce napalm and chapters in the Los Angeles area decided to protest. On a hot Saturday afternoon more than 150 picketers appeared and marched in front of the plant's outer fence for two hours. The best of the signs carried was "Death Begins at Dow". On the opposite side of the highway were 75 highway partolmen to protect the refinery from us (?). After two hours picketing, we withdrew to an adjacent field for a rally. Here the Torrence Police Chief told us that according to a Torrence ordinance, we could not leaflet in downtown Torrence without a permit from the City Council.

There was a short debate with the decision to not get people arrested that day to test

a civil liberties issue because we had not made legal preparation. There were two speakers, myself and a pacifist organizer. His remarks expressed a rather simple moral outrage. "We're here because we demand President Johnson admit his mistake in the illegal war in Vietnam." After the rally most everyone went home feeling they had done their part against the war for the week.

But what had been done? No striking visual image was created so that the passing motorists realized the economic health of their community rested on the continued incineration of villages and people in Vietnam. In fact most motorists drove by struck by the beatnik/communist image that we hadn't been imaginative enough to transcend. No workers in the plant went through a personal moral confrontation about their livelihood being bound to war production. We didn't educate the townspeople, the passing motorists or the cops about the war. We didn't interfere with the production of the plant. We didn't even gear the demonstration to deepen the analysis of the demonstrators. The net effect was that some (continued on page 3)

by Jim Wallihan, Indiana University SDS

In a pre-election effort to bolster sagging support for his Administration and his war, President Johnson has planned a series of weekend tours throughout the country. The first of these trips, through Indiana, Kentucky, and Illinois, began on Saturday, July 23, and was gauged to create the illusion of unanimous support, interestingly enough, in a section where peace activity has been somewhat less visible than on the two coasts.

On three days notice, peace groups along the presidential route coordinated a series of "welcoming committees" to greet the President at major stops. One purpose of these actions was to counter the political strategy of the tour by demonstrating broad and visible opposition to the war.

In preparation for the first stop, in Indianapolis, LBJ's rightwing friend Eugene Pulliam, publisher of the Indianapolis Star, printed what was essentially an open call for the American Legion and all war-supporters to turn out en masse. The peace demonstration, of which they had gotten word, was held out

On Saturday, Indiana University SDS and Bloomington Committee to End the War turned out around 400 people to greet Johnson at Indianapolis. Support came from local SDSers, Antioch SDS people, including Paul Millman and Art Rosenstein, Dayton and Cincinnatti, and, as things developed, from fencesitters and bystanders. The demonstration was the largest ever assembled in Indianapolis.

In Louisville, Ky. and Jeffersonville, Ind. that evening, the Louisville Peace and Freedom Center brought out 40 people, a decent turnout for the Louisville movement, which is just forming. One sign read, "Welcome President Goldwater."

Events in Indianapolis developed into a major travesty of civil liberties, resulting in 29 arrests. Press Secretary Bill Movers that day said that the President felt that "dissident elements" should not be permitted to interfere with the majority and should be "deemphasized." Secret Servicemen, apparently acting on this suggestion, requested local police to clear all people carrying "derogatory" signs from areas where they would be visible to the President, the media, or the bulk of the crowd of about 40,000, many of whom were waving pro-war, pro-Johnson, and Hi-Luci signs.

The operation is best described as one in which the officials involved acted as extensions of Johnson's ego. They protected the President from seeing the dissent he fears so much ferreting out and arresting those who looked like they might even want to demonstrate. As people began to arrive an hour before Johnson's speech, police began making arrests on charges so false that even a pro-war, pro-escalation local television station has totally denounced the operation as a gross violation of civil liberties.

Although there were several, more flagrant, exceptions, the pattern seemed to be this: anyone carrying a sign mentioning Hartke, Fulbright, Kennedy, or peace was asked to hand over his sign. If they so much as asked "Why?", they were arrested. One police captain described the signs as subversive. A sergeant suggested that "it wouldn't be a bad idea to bring out the fire hoses on them.

Following are some of the incidents which occurred:

1. Susan Melvin of Bloomington was asked by police to drop her picket and did so. As she walked away she was arrested for lit-

2. David Kelly, Chairman of Indiana University SDS, was standing with several signs, held together in such a way that the messages could not be seen. A cop turned one over to see if it was a peace picket and shortly after returned to arrest Kelly.

3. Several people, some of whom had not even received signs, were arrested while standing on the lawn of Christ Church, with the permission of the pastor.

4. A Vista worker was arrested while attempting to help a five-year-old boy whose face had been chewed by a police dog.

5. Professor James Dinsmoor, who ran as a peace candidate for Congress in May, was arrested and roughed up on the way to the paddy wagon.

6. A one-legged veteran had his artificial leg kicked off and his stump bruised by police.

As far as anyone can tell, there was no provocation for any of the arrests. Demonstrators and by standers who indicated any concern over the arrests were lumped together as threats to Johnson's sensitivity and to the crumbling image of unanimous support for the war in the Midwest.

The twenty-nine were charged with such offenses as "creating a disturbance at a public gathering", "littering", "disturbing a peaceful assembly", and "interfering with an officer" and bail was set at \$100 for people living outside the county. It was clear to all who observed the arrests that the only instances of disturbance, interference, or littering were created by the police and the Secret Service.

In court on the following Monday, the State refused to prosecute the twenty-nine, who are being defended by lawyers from the Indiana Civil Liberties Union. The city then rearrested, re-fingerprinted, and re-booked all but one or two of the twenty-nine and changed the charges. In cases where demonstrators had been charged with violations of state laws, they are now charged with violations of city ordinances. In many instances, the new charges bear little resemblance to the old ones. The cases have now been continued and taken under advisement until

Reaction to the action has appeared to backfire, with support for the demonstrators' case developing in unexpected quarters. The arrests were obviously political and Indianapolis is now rife with rumors of splits (continued on page 3)

July 29, 1966 Vol. 1, No. 28 let the people decide

new left notes

an internal newspaper of

students for a democratic society

This issue of NLN will be my last issue as editor. If people have been reading the NAC minutes, they will have learned that I am leaving the national staff. In light of the fact that I was elected Assistant National Secretary at the last NC with the understanding that I would stay on staff until the convention, this may seem to be irresponsible. I would like to state my reasons for

1608 w. madison, rm. 206

When I came to work for the NO, it was due to an accident. I did not plan to stay for longer than six weeks at the most. I felt at the end of that period that until the staff situation in the office could be improved in terms of the functioning of the NO as an office, I should stay. I would set time limits at the end of which I would want to leave, however, everytime I would start to think about leaving there would seem to be a new crisis which I would feel I should stay and help out in for a while. The last and longest lasting of these crises came when I became editor of NLN. I had no experience which should qualify me to be the editor of a newspaper, and several people have indicated that they would like to become editor who did have such experience. It is precisely because NLN is NOT a newspaper but a internal newsletter of SDS, that I retained the job of editor. It is felt by the NAC that the qualifications of the editor of NLN should fall into three prioritised groupings, and that the least important of these qualifications is editorial

First, the editor of NLN MUST be be a person tolerant toward the viewpoints of other members of SDS with whom he politically disagrees. This means that the editor must be a person who will print viewpoints which he disagrees with, without trying to change the meaning of what was said, and without falling victim to the urge to reply to everything with which he disagrees. Second, the editor of NLN should have experience in SDS at more than the chapter level. This means that the editor should be someone who knows many people of divergent viewpoints and geographic origin within the organization. Third, it would be nice if the editor had previous editorial experience. This means that we would prefer someone who has the first two qualifications plus some experience in putting-out a newspaper, but whoever is editor must have those first two qualifications even if it means that he has

no previous editorial experience. When I became convinced that Greg Calvert had the first two qualifications for editor lannounced that I wished to leave. The reasons I gave are very real reasons for leaving. For the benefit of those of you who have never worked in the NO (almost all of you) I will

chicago, ill. 60612

There are three types of people who want to work in the NO. First there are the people who should not work in an office situation; but, because of some kind of mythical belief in the NO as an important political place, they feel that they should work in the NO. These are people who have been important in their chapters and may be very competent people in many situations but are totally incompetent when it becomes necessary for them to work in an office and do large amounts of boring paperwork for 8-12 hours every day of the week. Most of these people leave as soon as they discover that they cannot do the job which they are expected to do. In large part they are the cause of the rapid turnover of office staff. Second, there are the people who are capable of working in any office and who do the same amount of work that they would do if they were working in any other office. Third, there are the super-efficient bureaucrats. I place myself in this third group. The problem with being a super-efficient is that while you can do more in an 8-hour day office than most people do in two such days, you are so good at doing things that you end up working a 16 hour day in order to get all the things done which you feel have to get done. This is demoralizing in many ways. First, it completely destroys you as anything except an automaton. Second, because you work so hard you feel very bitter because the other staff members don't feel the same way, or, if some of the other staff members try to follow your example and they are not capable of doing the same amounts of work that you can, then they become demoralized and that makes you more demoralized. Third, you begin to become very upset about SDS and the membership because you feel that more people should be doing the hard work. And last, people begin to depend on you and you start to feel that you are indispensible. can think of nothing in an organization such as SDS more demoralizing than feeling

Speck

This is being written at 3 a.m., to get in before NLN deadline, but will try to make it as coherent as possible.

In last week's issues of NLN there was a proposal for a student strike Nov. 4 by Bettina Apthecker, to be sponsored by an ad hoc group of individuals. I was asked to sign the call. The NAC decided to send the proposal and the substance of the NAC discussion to the NIC, which is supposed to make political decisions between National Council meetings. Friday night, Saturday, and Sunday were spent calling the members of the NIC and the regional offices, taping their responses.

People called: Al Haber, Jeremy Brecher, Paul Booth, Stan Aronowitz, Dick Flacks, Helen Garvey, Todd Gitlin, Ed Hamlett, Carol McEldowney, Dave Smith, Dic Magidoff, Clark Kissinger, Jeff Shero, and the California and Boston regional office. We received letters from Anthony Hyde of SUPA, Marvin Garson of Berkeley, and Steve Baum of the Chicago Regional Office.

People not called: Carl Oglesby (out of country), Bob Pardun (no phone), Liora Proctor (no phone), Nick Egleson (in transit), N.Y. regional office, (no response).

This report will be brief, as the transcription of the tape is not complete. Most of the discussion will be omitted -- see next

week's issue

There was total consensus that I should not sign the call at this time, in light of the coming convention and NC. Rationale

There was strong feeling that a student strike might be a good thing, but that sentiment on the campus (among both the students and faculty) needed to be felt out first. Most of the people called agreed with the NAC analysis of the call: that ad hoc committees of prominent people were undemocratic, did not tend to build continuing program, tend to disperse our energies without building strategy. There was a strongly expressed need for programmatic discussion at the NC. A few people thought that there was implied sectarianism in the NAC response, that SDS should participate in actions called for by ad hoc groups as that is often the only way that groups that quibble among themselves can work together.

Programmatic suggestions which were made were:

- 1) That action begin in October oriented toward the elections: support peace candidates, oppose Johnson-supporting liberals. (Al Haber)
- 2) That the student strike be put off till spring or next year in light of the difficulty of organizing such a program. Also in light

of the difficulty of communicating the program to new chapters without it being pushed as a "line". (S.F. regional office, Keń McEldowney)

- 3) That the strike be after the elections, both because of the time needed to organize and the sentiment against electoral politics felt by many SDS people. (Jeff Shero, S.F. regional office, Helen Garvy, Dave Smith)
- regional office, Helen Garvy, Dave Smith).
 4) That a strike be international. (Jeff Shero, Steve Baum)
- 5) That whatever program we adopt it be oriented around the draft, as that's a way to reach people where their lives are affected, also offers an opportunity to reach into the ghetto and high schools. (Jeff S.)
- 6) That the program be oriented around the educational system which molds us, thereby bringing in high school students as well as college students, and is broader than the draft. (Helen Garvy)
- 7) We should have a program which involves civil disobedience. (Al Haber)

Tony Hyde of SUPA was discouraging about the possibility of an effective student strike in Canada. It will be brought up at their Federal Council meeting July 30 to 31 at Edmenton, Alberta.

Hopefully, this will serve as a spur for discussion about the nature of our strategy

and program for the coming year. People should let us know how they feel about any and all of the proposed programs, whether they think we should take more initiative on anti-war activity or leave that to the NCC or ad hoc groups, and if we are to develop programs around anti-war feeling, what the nature of these programs should be.

See also Steve Baum's letter, and the letter from and reply to Marvin Garson.

clarification

Bettina called the national office Monday and pointed out (correctly) that the call was to a meeting to plan a student strike, not for the strike itself. This may change people's responses to my signing of the call, as at that meeting various groups could meet and talkabout the proposed November 4 action, after the NC.

My feeling personally is that even in light of that correction I should not sign the call, as the response from the NIC has been far from unanimous about the idea of a strike. It seems that it would be bad to in some way commit SDS to supporting an action which the NC may turn down.

I think that we should participate in such a meeting should it happen, but not give our backing to it until after the NC.

Jane Adams

individuals respond to strike proposal

Dear Jane,

In reference to Bettina Apthecker's National Student Strike. Both Earl (Silbar) and I presented this idea to the December N.C. At that time it was voted down. Since then the Vietnam War has escalated and so has the movement on the campuses via anti-war and university cooperation with Selective Service (anti-rank).

I feel that the concept of a student strike would be a means of drawing together the anti-war and anti-rank movement. Also it's much more difficult for the Government to side step a highly organized student strike as it has been able to parry sporadic sitins and demonstrations.

I would argue that a student strike should be an International student strike. I'm not sure why Bettina advocates just a national affair. Possibly C.P. politics. An international student demonstration would tie up the anti-U.S. sentiment abroad via Vietnam, NATO, nuclear weapons, imperialism, etc. with the growing radical U.S. student movement. This is a must for SDS.

I would also argue that there should be a follow-up international student strike in the spring. There are a number of reasons for

- 1) It would give foreign students a greater chance to mobilize.
- 2) It would not be a one shot affair.

3) It would be based on program -- antiwar, anti-rank and student control of the university -- SDS's multi-issue approach (civil rights, labor, university, community).

I agree 100% with Greg's third point that SDS must assume the leadership in the antiwar movement. I have been one of a minority in SDS that has advocated just this. SDS has abdicated its potential for politically influencing the entire anti-war movement under the guise that we must maintain our multi-issue approach. What many of the old leadership have failed to understand is that when you have tens of thousands of people in motion you do not sit back and say this is single issue therefore we must not organizationally assume leadership. I strongly feel that we should take leadership with the express purpose of introducing the multi-issue approach and relating Vietnam to labor to civil rights to community etc. We should turn the anti-war movement into an anti-system movement.

I further agree that any student strike that is called should be planned and politically directed by SDS. We are the student power in the country, we must start showing our muscles.

I do not feel Jane should sign the ad hoc

call. We should issue an SDS call pending convention (should read National Council) action where it can be fully discussed.

In Revolution, Steve Baum

Dear Jane,

a) Who is Bettina Apthecker?

b) I know who Bettina Apthecker is, but why get so excited just because she has an idea? Lots of people have ideas.

c) Clearly something specific is in the wind, and you probably know what it is, but your "REACTIONS OF SDS NAC" hints all around the subject by talking purely at the level of general principle. For instance, do you have any idea who some of those "prominent individuals" might be whom Bettina thinks should sponsor the strike?

d) I am amazed that Bettina, of all people, should propose a student strike; in fact, I am led to suspect that it is not really her idea after all. You may not have heard about it back East, but we have already had a student strike here in Berkeley. The reason you may not have heard about it is that it was such a dismal failure. Bettina knows all about our strike last February, since she was in the VDC leadership at the time. In urging you to support the November 4 action, surely Bettina has a duty to tell you about our strike, and why she thinks whatever went wrong could be avoided next time. General opinion here has it that the strike failed not because it was "sold out" or screwed up, but because it was entirely misconceived. Most people felt just plain silly walking out of an anthropology class as a protest against the war; it just didn't make any emotional

3) I propose that as a first step the SDS National Office share with the membership all the specific knowledge it has of the people behind this strike proposal, and its assessment of their motives.

Yours fraternally, Marvin Garson

Dear Marvin:

In reply to your questions in order:

Bettina Apthecker is a girl from California, active in the VDC, a member of the Communist Party, daughter of Herbert Apthecker.

Bettina came to me asking for me to sign a call for a student strike. It seemed to me and to the NAC that this is an organizational decision, as my signature to a call for any action, as national secretary, has organizational implications. The NAC is formed as an administrative and not political body, and therefore cannot mandate me: it is pro-

perly the function of the NIC to make such decisions. I realize that the NIC has not been consulted much in the past, but it is elected for a reason, and we were hoping to make it fulfill that function.

On points number (c) and (d), I think you missed the point that the NAC was trying to make. It doesn't really matter what motivated Bettina, who she is associated with, etc. The important thing, as we saw it, is that for the past year, SDS has done little programmatic and strategic thinking. Most of our activity has been based around calls by other organizations or ad hoc groups. I get the feeling in the chapters that we don't really know where we're going and are picking up on action to fill a vacuum, rather than as part of a continuing program. My feeling, and the feeling of the NAC, was that this needs to stop. The way it stops is by SDS planning on a strategic level, and participating in ad hoc actions as those actions fit into our strategy.

In that light, it is unimportant whether Bettina is acting as an individual, as a member of the C.P., as a person who is close to the DuBois Clubs, as a member of the VDC, or whatever. I also don't know what her motivation was, other than to organize a broad anti-war protest, supporting peace candidates. She had talked to the DuBois people and was going to talk to YCS. I'm not sure who all she wanted to sign the call, though it included people like Staughton Lynd.

We do hope that the discussion raised by this mailing has spurred discussion and thinking, and re-activated the NIC as a decisionmaking body. I hope this answers your questions.

pax, Jane Adams

Dear Jane,

I received your communication regarding a student strike yesterday. I am on an AFSC work project this summer and the other nine participants are also college or ex-college students. It was the feeling of all of us that a strike is a good idea* I am now writing from the Region Office and understand that you may not endorse the strike. This would be a big mistake.

It was felt that SDS overestimates its power to an extent; and it would be wrong to call a strike solely so that SDS could grow. However, a successful strike (which I and those I have talked to feel is possible) would do a lot of good.

it would enhance the prestige of SDS and the New Left.

bases of support for other radical programs would be built up through the strike action.

 at some campuses support of the war effort, the draft, and the CIA would be affected.

 there might be some affect on the national elections.

The reason that the above happenings can take place is at least dual. Any national or international success of near-success is impressive to both the general public and the power structure of the U.S. and the allies of the U.S. Masses of students on strike at name schools is good even without the support of the smaller colleges and junior colleges. From the SDS chapter list however it seems that many small schools would also be affected. At small non-radical colleges this would have a large effect on the local populace.

Other thoughts:

1) Nov. is a good time for the strike since it is just before the elections and would provide a success from which to work during the remaining school year. The strike can be organized on campuses by Nov. 4, especially since there is little academic work before then.

2) nationally we must beware of too much organization.

3) ask for people to strike from a broad base – not only against Imperialism, but because they are unsure as to moral justification for the war, the draft, against the way the war is being fought, don't want Americans to die, or just they don't want to be drafted.

4) the call should not be made by organizations as this drives away the middle-class liberals.

5) National publicity should be tried for without centering upon a few individuals or schools (this pertains mainly to the pre-strike publicity.)

6) each local group should be allowed to draw up its own statement (hopefully a broad one, see point #3).

7) on the day of the strike rallies or teach-ins should be held throughout the time that classes are in session Sit-ins at draft boards, marches, etc. could also take place

8) Sheila Cooper of YCND and other European youth and/or peace movements should be contacted for international support (Sheila expressed great interest in an international action of this type to me last summer)

perhaps an ad in a national newspaper (i.e. - N.Y. Times) could be taken out by a few thousand students—students only—

(continued on page 3)

convention agenda reports

The convention will officially begin Satur- ram are those that duplicate others and day night, Aug. 27, in an attempt to show to the world that SDS still has humanist concerns. The party will begin at around 8:30 and people should bring whatever they feel they will need. At 10:30 Sunday morning, we will gather to pray and be given the agenda of workshops for the following three

That agenda will consist of a list of workshops, panels and formal debates along with the time they will begin and an outline of their content. All workshops should be preplanned and have resource people selected beforehand. People wanting to have workshops or panels on specific topics should send us as soon as possible the names of people responsible for them and prospectuses so that we might be able to arrange them in as rational a manner as we are able. Unless we are flooded, the only workshops that will not be put separately on the progwhich can be put together. Throughout that three-day period, there will be a broad topical variety of workshops and panels presented and as they often will run concurrently, people will be forced to choose which they wish to attend. We will also try to save a small amount of time for ad hoc workshops arising out of discussion in scheduled meetings.

The first plenary session will be held the morning of Wed., Aug. 31, and will consider specific resolution proposals submitted via NLN or arising out of workshops. We will try to have some sort of fairly efficient reproducing equipment available so that anyone with specific proposals will be able to have them viewed publicly prior to the plenary session in which they will be considered. Following the adoption of resolutions will be constitutional amendments and the election of officers. To be adopted and

effected this year, constitutional amendments must be put before the membership at least one month before the convention and all those made from the floor will not go into effect until the following year.

As envisioned, workshops and plenary sessions will not meet late into the night, but rather, will end in late afternoon, leaving a reasonable amount of time for informal discussion and relaxation. We will attempt to put together some sort of nightly program for at least the first four nights, consisting of dances, hootenanies, movies, special speakers or whatever. Part of the reason for this is to keep from totally wearing people out in any given day's session, so that meetings can begin promptly after breakfast each day.

As this issue of NLN may be the last one able to reach the entire membership, we will make provisions to put together a packet of working papers to be distributed at the convention, but even with that provision, we will need to get those working papers by no later than the second week in August to be able to print them. People who will be unable to get their papers to us by then should make their own provisions for reproducing them.

Following the convention will be the regular summer NC. People with agenda proposals for it should get them to us as soon as possible so that they may be made public prior to the first session of the NC and hopefully cutting down the amount of time spent in agenda debate and leaving enough time to do the work necessary. We will also continue to demand credentials so that chapters should send us the names of their delegates and alternates immediately. The credentials committee will be tougher than it has been in the past so that chapters sending delegates without prior notification may find themselves denied their votes.

NEW LEFT NOTES

Published weekly by Students for a Democratic Society, 1103 E. 63rd St., Chicago, Ill. 60637. Phone (312) 667-6050. Second-class postage paid at Chicago, Illinois. Subscriptions: \$1 a year for members; \$5 a year for non-members. Signed articles and letters are the responsibility of the writer. Unsigned articles are the responsibility of the Editor, Speck.

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Carl Oglesby, president; Jeffry Shero, vice-president; and Jane Adams, national

secretary.
National Office: 1608 W. Madison, Rm. 206, Chicago, III. 60612 (312) 666-3874
New York City: 49 West 27th St., NYC, NY 10001; (212) 889-5793
Niagra Region: 107 Dryden Rd., Ithaca, NY
Northern California: 924 Howard St., San Francisco, Calif; (415) 362-7922
Southern California: 1347-1/2 Riviera Ave., Venice, Calif.
New England: 2076 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass. (617) 547-5457
Chicago Region: 2059 N. Larrabee, Chicago, III. (312) 944-3624
Dedical Education Project: CAD Voice SAB, Univ. of Mich. App. App. App.

Radical Education Project; CAO Voice, SAB, Univ. of Mich., Ann Arbor, Mich.

Vol. 1, No. 28

let the people decide

(cont) nic response

(continued from page 1)

Please excuse my incoherence and the lack of deep reflection into the weighty problems that are being confronted.

Support the Strike, Terry Koch NC, Washington Univ.

P.S. If you need to phone me collect at 415 658-3995.

* I was also phoned by my friends in St. Louis and they agree and are writing another

Dear Jane and/or NIC member:

We don't know whether this will be in time to influence any important decision-making, but for what it's worth, the following is the general feeling of our chapter about the proposed student strike:

1. There should be noformal signature put to it by S.D.S. until our National Convention has met at the end of August. This is based on the supposition that nothing is going to be made public on any appreciable scale until universities resume in September any

2. In general, we like the idea, and think that it's being broadly conceived-that is, against the draft and campus participation in the war effort, as well as just against war-is a very great factor in its potential. for success. (This is no doubt influenced by our experience here at Wisconsin during the wave of sit-ins.)

3. We think the leadership of S.D.S. should keep in contact with the leadership of the student strike, work with them informally, and keep us informed of the plans as they evolve. They should especially be prepared to give an up-to-date report on it to the National Convention.

4. When a formal signature is made, assuming it will be, it should be by both the President of S.D.S. and the National Secretary, or conceivably the President alone, but not just the National Secretary alone. This is irrespective of who those officers happen to be at any time; it is a matter of what. the meaning of those two offices happens

We'll be interested to see what the rest of S.D.S. and the peace movement in general. can make of this.

Best wishes.

-Bob Stanton

nac minutes

Sunday July 23, 1966 NAC members present - Adams, Calvert, Weissman, Le Blanc; others - Dahlberg.

1. Convention Program. Le Blanc was given responsibility of putting together the entire convention program and urged to work to complete it with all deliberate speed. Regional offices and chapters as well as REP should be urged to solicit contributory greetings and advertisements for the convention program and be offered 25% of all money they solicit.

2. It was decided that former staff members who are owed back-salary shall be paid \$15 per week until such debts are eliminated. It was decided further that present staff members who are owed back-salary shall be paid \$10 per week over and such debts are eliminated.

3. It was reported that the Convention Planning Committee isn't functioning, that little is shown by members of that committee over the necessity of meeting to plan for the convention, and that most of the work on the planning of the convention has fallen to one individual (Dahlberg). It was decided that another committee meeting should be called and also that Dahlberg should be authorized to go to the East Coast to make certain consultations and arrangements for the convention. Dahlberg agreed to send in regular reports while absent from the N.O.

4. Proposal - NAC meetings be scheduled for Monday's at 5:30 p.m. at the N.O.

5. It was decided that John Maher or Quentin Basset would be asked to attend the Two-Nation Conference on Peace in Vietnam in Japan to which SDS has been invited to send a delegate.

6. Question - Should we send membership list of SDS to an SDS member who wants to use it in a political campaign in which he is working?

Decision - The National Office should send out membership lists only to projects officially supported - locally or nationally - by SDS.

7. Decision not to buy buttons on consignment from War Resisters League, due to

8. Decision to advise support of boycott of the Chase Manhatten and National City

(continued on page 8)

(cont) crackdown

(continued from page 1)

between the police department, which seems to be pushing hard for convictions in order to save face, and politicians. Senator Vance Hartke is reported to be particularly incensed, since this is only the latest in a series of splits between him and the President. The police, in assisting the Administration to develop war support, confiscated several signs supporting Hartke's stand against escalation. Hartke knows that his political life is at stake if this kind of suppression is successful.

The charges against the demonstrators are so flimsy that the police may have to fall back on the fact, admitted by Police Chief Jones, that they acted on the request of the Secret Service. Thus the Administration, although trying to avoid the problem it started, may become deeply involved, unless it can pressure the police into suffering quietly. The fact is clear, however, that the Administration and its domestic handling of Vietnam policy are already involved.

The events of July 23rd point up several things which may be of use to anti-war groups planning similar welcoming committees, on other weekend tours before November. Johnson is obviously determined to take severe measures to insure that visible dissent will not exist. The Indianapolis demonin a restricted area where it was reported to be out of the President's sight. The President is out of sight if he thinks these tactics will continue to work.

There are several ways in which we can insure that radical welcoming committees will be in a position to make their dissent visible. One suggestion might be to cover all signs and assemble piecemeal within full view of platforms, cameras, and audiences, revealing the signs only when the President arrives. Inventive radicals can undoubtedly work out unique ways to deal with various situations. The July 23rd demonstration at Indianapolis indicates one set of police state tactics with which we may have to deal in other cities.

The struggle to redress the Indianapolis. travesty may be a long and expensive one. Contributions for defense should be sent to SDS, c/o Indiana Memorial Union, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47401.

(cont) sds phenomenon

(continued from page 1)

demonstrators felt more morally strong and maybe developed a slight sense of community, all of which is laudatory, but has precious little to do with stopping the war.

Non-violent civil right demonstrations in the South contained the elements for stark moral confrontation that the Vietnam protests lack. Police dogs being loosed on Negro teenagers non-violently demonstrating in Birmingham revealed the racist South in a way that no glib apologist politician could explain away. As Steve Weisman argues, a march against the war which blocks traffic in downtown streets doesn't evoke a clear understanding of just what the marchers are opposed to. For example, an action in Washington that would be much clearer to the public than marching through the streets to the Washington Monument would be an attempt to paralyze the Pentagon. If 10,000 anti-war demonstrators blocked the entrance to the parking lot which surrounds the Pentagon, people could better understand our objections. An attempt to prevent the operations of the Pentagon with that massive structure looming in the background of the TV pictures would make more clear our spokesman's attacks on the policy-making role of our military in foreign policy, or the military's use of funds that could be better spent at home. The man in the street would understand that we were saying the Pentagon was central to our war critique. The same man would have a good deal more difficulty understanding a march through the street to the Washington Monument.

S.D.S.'s reluctance to deal with more serious questions of power in American society has increasingly led us to personal witness protests which have little political relevance. Others facing this dilemma lapsed into inactivity. I think one reason that some activists have become more involved with using drugs is that protest politics became more an acting out of our alienation rather than meaningful attempts to change the society. LSD better counters the individual's estrangement and makes it easier to ignore alienation, than marching with a picket sign. The problem for S.D.S. is to develop programs that deal with power, rather than offer the dead end of continued acting out (like the theater of the absurd?) our disaffection.

Let me give an example. I was in the Los Angeles Regional Office when the DuBois regional organizer hurried in and quickly explained, "We're going to have this big demonstration in front of Bova's precinct station (the cop that shot Deadwyler to death and went unpunished after a grand jury hearing.) There hasn't been any public outcry. Would you contact your chapters." He left rather quickly to contact other groups.

Several of us were sitting around in the office, including two black nationalists from Watts. We discussed the proposed demonstration. The black nationalists argued: The reality of our situation is that the police continue to have a disregard for us as humans; brutality is commonplace; they can and do shoot us and get away with it; Watts is violent. There's only two things you can do that count. You can organize a base large enough to gain power to change the Los Angeles Police force, or when the next riots start you can go down and block up the police stations so they can't get their cars out to come down and shoot us. Anything else you do is illusory. Picketing in front of Bova's precinct station eases your consciences; it does nothing about our situation

Events ring with their urgency. Lyndon Johnson in Omaha has now established our commitment to do battle against Communism in all Southeast Asia. Fulbright asks: Is this America's new Manifest Destiny. The ghettoes explode and the National Guard occupies them as foreign territories. What we must decide in S. D. S. is how seriously committed we are to bringing about change. If we decide that we are willing to sacrifice for that change, then we must develop political programs that go beyond marches, fasts, personal witnesses and other symbolic forms of protest. We must deal with questions of power rather than act out our generation's

-Jeff Shero

convention working paper: the crisis of

I. facing the american leviathan

WE FACE AMERICA THE LEVIATHAN, Our nation attempts throughout the world to guard by force an order of power relations in which established American interests are respected and achieved. Everywhere American reality conflicts with our values: to our assertion of the dignity of individuals, of the values of love, honesty, reason, and equality, America responds with war, manipulation, and the selfish concentration of

The America which we face denies democracy - it is a nation in which the crucial economic decisions which affect us all are made by corporate managers and bankers, in which millions of people are dependent on the indulgence of public welfare systems over which they have no control, in which the decisions of war and peace are made by a clique of advisers and experts. Can this be called democracy? We understand democracy to be that system of rule in which the people make the decisions

With every escalation of the war in Vietnam has come an increased awareness at home that the Cold War strategy is having no impact on the root problem of Revolution. The unrest in the Black ghettoes gives ample indication that the war on poverty and its accompanying housing and education programs are having no impact on poverty in America.

We speak as a new American left – a new generation of radical democrats trying to point a way out of the crisis. Our vision for the reconstruction of America comes out of our experience as products of the dominant culture and as activists fighting its most obvious injustices, and out of our democratic values as people seeking a decent and humane order, recognizing the inherent equality of men, and freeing their capacities for love, reason, and creativity.

We speak as a new American left -- affirming the heritage of Americans who have championed the cause of the people against corporate power, populists of the nineteenth century. Socialists of the early 1900's and workers who built the industrial unions. While we reject the dogmas and sectarianism of the Old Left, we adopt as our own that affect their lives. But ours is a time of crisis for that leviathan. The old explanations provide no direction, the old programs of liberalism are washouts. Violence in Vietnam and poverty at home give daily evidence of the crisis. The lives of our whole generation give further evidence of the disintegration of the old standards. Young Americans are no longer impressed by the old morality or the old patriotism: neither Lyndon's war nor Lady Bird's beautification campaign turns us on. Nor are we content to take our places among the managers and the managed. Both the Cold War ideo logy and the liberal domestic program are

failures, and the country knows it. the best features of the idea of Socialism that moved them. At the same time, we develop an understanding of and a program to change the managed society of the '60s.

We speak as a new American left - committed to the achievement of political power in our time. We seek a redistribution of power in our society in favor of disenfranchised people who live in ghettoes, white and black, north and south, who work in factories, who are passive consumers of the culture, who are segregated systematically from their fellow-men. We seek political power so that men may at last prevail over the arrangements of society in which a few control the destinies of all.

These commitments set an intellectual agenda. The first task of the crisis is to identify its key questions and work to find the answers around which a strategy of

change can be built.

Paul Booth

II. united states and the third world

"Con los pobres de la tierra, quiero yo mi siempre echar."

Vietnam is the flaming symbol to the world of the American arrogance that has already made itself felt in the day-to-day representation of our country by diplomats and businessmen and tourists. In Vietnam it is a more serious matter than the kind of misunderstanding of or scorn for another countries symbols and customs that has previously caused bitterness and mistrust. It is now arrogance toward human life.

However the war's strategists calculate the ramifications of this bombing mission or that rural pacification scheme, it is clear that Vietnamese lives are not assigned a heavy weight. From time to time we hear that the fighting man in the sentry has respect for the VC opponents as "plucky and determined", but the overall operating assumption is that the VC are bandits and desperadoes; any kind of torture is justified to repay such acts of desperate terrorism as the bombings of Saigon restaurants and the executions of village headmen. Civilians -- and there are now over a million refugees in Saigon who have fled the bombings of their villages are pawns in the game, to be relocated from their village according to one General's motion of "strategic hamlets," to be kept under meticulous police observation and control in the truly totalitarian schemes known as "rural pacification." Buddhist and other anti-Communist nationalists are a disruptive force, who must be repressed because their activity works objectively to the advantage of the Communists: neutralists are banned from the "free elections" even though non-alignment was the hope of the Geneva Conventions we claim to honor. The North Vietnamese, bombed to fulfill the requirements of LBJ's devil theory, are utterly hapless -- even if they withdrew all support from the Southern Liberation Front, we would still have to bomb them. As for our allies, their soldiers are "apathetic" according to our GI's who now do most of the fighting.

Why Viet Nam? The Cold War is one answer. The balance of power among Great Powers must be respected; in particular, China must be contained. Russia is proving a willing participant in Great Power politics, and China must also refrain from destabilizing that balance. "Wars of Liberation" are the most widespread threat to international stability and China advocates those wars. Chinese Communism is a virile alternative to the pattern of oligarchic and military dominance in the Third World, to the growing desperation of the masses of people in those countries. So the war is pre-eminently a demonstration of our power to contain communism a few hundred miles from the borders of Red China. When Dean

Rusk complains that he has put out peace feelers but the Chinese are never at the other end of the phone, he means that they don't want to participate in a conversation with us as Great Power to Great Power. When we announce that we want to contain China, not isolate her, we mean for China to pick up the receiver and tell Dean Rusk that she will assume the style of a Great Power, and not champion the cause of a small nationalism against another Great

Why Viet Nam? The American response to revolution is the other answer. In practice, our nation is a powerful opponent of revolutionary change, and a startingly successful opponent. Although our leaders make rhetorical gestures acknowledging the radical disparities between rich and poor throughout the Third World and the desparate need for economic development, these are frequently vague phrases. When they contain promises, as did the Alliance for Progress, promising backing for land reform, tax reform, and opposition to military rule, they are betrayed down the line. In practice our Peace Corps is an insignificant gesture next to the Marine Corps and the Exploitation Corps.

Throughout the Third World, the force of nationalism is increasingly powerful. The desire for independent development has not been quenched by the end of colonialism; in many countries this has only created an increased expectation that now the New Nations could determine their own economic courses, international course, cultural course. Where Western investors have warped the economies by channeling all energy into the extraction of primary products, the New Nations have attempted to develop a neutralist force. Where our businesses have propagated the culture of Frigidaires and Coca-Cola, the New Nations have sought to recreate national identity, and bring to life their own heritages. Increasingly, American power in the Sixties has worked to limit the choices for nationalists. We are the agent of polarization, our terms are "freedom or Communism". Nationalists and revolutionists must inevitably become those "Communists" under the impact of our military might, for we now intervene consistently against the revolutionaries. And when we support Ky against the Buddhists, Balaguer against Bosch, Castelo-Branco against Goulart, Boumedienne against Ben Bella - and support them powerfully, not merely in rhetoric -- we demonstrate how completely we are committed to Counter-Revolution. It should be no surprise that movements like the Vietnamese Liberation Front - which advocate land redistribution -- have popular support, while the U.S. is increasingly hated. Our local collaborators, true to the spirit of foreign aid, "help themselves." But Viet Nam represents the

current arena of the fight to defeat any and all revolutions, and so fight it we must, and to the bitter end. And with whatever means at our disposal: the Air Force, the Army, the Special Forces, General Lansdale and his Rural Pacifiers, the AID teams, everyone is told to "Do your thing". It is almost as if we wish to build and burn our way into the hearts of the Vietnamese so that they would not desire land, and would not desire a Vietnamese nation. Experience shows that the anti-communist leaders of our dreams have not developed who could both rally popular support and modernize.

But poverty is the overwhelming problem of these countries. This is the poverty of desperate hunger; Gerassi tells us "Threefourths of Latin Americans are constantly hungry. The average daily calorie intake is 1,200, when normal subsistency is donsidered 2,400 (and our average in the United State is 3,100). Many Latin Americans actually die from starvation. In Haiti peasants are forced to trap skinny pigeons for food. In Peru and Chile, many eat every other day, and often average as low as 500 calo-

This is also the poverty of radical inequality, where the masses are hungry and diseased and a very few are as rich as the opulent Americans they imitate. This is the real instability, of millions not knowing where the next meal will come from. By any criteria of judgment, by any humane values, these disparities require a radical solution.

The Cold War is deeply embeded in our culture. America misunderstands the turbulence in the underdeveloped world by interpreting it as the product of the struggle between east and west blocs. The emotions on which insurgencies in the Third World draw are genuine and intense -- they come from the demands for national integrity and for relief from poverty. This revolutionary upsurge is a challenge to the assumption on which our leaders work -- that concerted political movements are invariably the products of manipulation and subversion. We are so accustomed to top-down control in our own society that we forget that man is capable of doing the opposite - of working to change the conditions of his oppression.

THE AMERICAN PRESENCE

In the world, the American presence is truly awe-inspiring. A sixty-year commitment to the extension of American influence has made our country the Great Power that towers over the others. The power of American fighting men is visible in 48 countries, the power of our investors is felt in several dozen more. Friendly regimes show their loyalties at the turn of each year when they take out full-page ads in the New York Times Review of the Year's Business.

THAILAND WELCOMES FOREIGN INVEST-

" . . . The state guarantees against expropriation or nationalization of private industry . . . A new promoted industry will be exempt from income tax for a period of five years . . . Thailand possesses vast amounts of natural resources and also large, peaceful, cheap and adaptable labor forces awaiting to be developed with the assistance of foreign captial . . .

This is a statement of pride from Thailand as recorded in the New York Times. Page after page, its annual international financial report is a testimony of the virtues of stability, the accepted object of government in most countries of the underdeveloped world. The question is, however, stability

That vaunted stability is the slogan of the American ambition to manage the whole world. In practice, stability acquires more meaning than the benevolent wish of Dean Rusk's rhetoric that all countries could have the same domestic tranquility that America has. It means:

- Stable currencies, so that foreign investors can be sure that when they enter into a transaction they can be sure that the rate of return on that loan or investment will not be obliterated by inflation. This is known as the Austerity Policy (hold the line on wages and projects of social spending), such as practiced by Pres. Arturo Alexsandri of Chile between 1958 and 1963. He did bring down annual inflation from 38% to 10%, but even with the US forking out 70% of the cost, his economic development plan brought annual growth of 1.4%, compared to a population growth of 2.5%. Unemployment rose to 18%.
- * Stable policies, so that the alliance system of the Cold War created by Acheson and Dulles not be disturbed. Four dozen countries are tied into our network of alliances, and when one moves from being pro-U.S. to neutralism, as Iraq did in 1958, we send the Marines to the neighboring countries, or we encourage the local military to dump the regime, as in Brazil in 1961 and 1964 - where the crime was not neutralism but an independent foreign policy extending trade relations to Russia, China, and E. Germany.
- * Stable policing of internal forces of unrest, so that "Communists" and other movements that might bring about regimes less respectful of the virtues of the other stabilities get nipped in the bud. To train police, John Kennedy created the famous Special Forces as an independent unit. and through U. S. military aid missions has them training civic action teams in rural counter-insurgency and police forces (continued on page 5)

in urban tactics. They are atworkin dozens of countries, and in Peru and Columbia (and others we aren't told about) they are going up into hills as advisors, just like Vietnam.

In order to make possible the coup that replaced Patrice Lumumba in the Congo, we provided the cash so that Joseph Mobuto could pay his troops. One year after FDR declared the Good Neighbor policy, our ambassador gave his blessing to Anastasio Somoza's proposal to assassinate the Nicaraguan hero Sandino; the Somozas then ruled by terror for 25 years. * Stable relations to American-owned industries. After Leonel Brizola nationalized the International Telephone and Telegraph subsidiary in Brazil's Rio Grande do Sul state, Senator Bourke Hickenlooper led a successful move to cut any country out of foreign aid that confiscated U. S. business without adequate (by our terms) compensation. One country that has been cut off is Ceylon - in July 1962 Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister, nationalized Esso, Shell, and Caltex filling stations and oil depots, and said, "The best form of foreign aid the U.S. can give to small countries is to abstain from interfering in their affairs." Generally we have been more successful in warding off such efforts; in Guatemala in 1954 we sent the CIA to overthrow a regime that was nibbling away at our plantations, and in Iran in 1950 the CIA overthrew Mossadegh to prevent nationalization of the oil industry. In the Dominican Republic we let Bosch fall because he proposed to keep collectivized the sugar plantations formerly

owned by the deposed Trujillo family. Our interference is almost never of the openness of the Dominican affair - generally our diplomacy, military aid, threats of sanctions by international banking institutions which we dominate, and political meddling of the covert and clandestine varieties will do the trick. Of course, none of these weapons are used against the regime of South Africa, where the annual rate of return on our \$500 million worth of investments is over 20%. In fact, the U.S. banking community together with the International Monetary Fund actually, bailed out that country during its 1961 financial crisis.

* Stable day-to-day politics. This turns out to be a set of dubious freedoms, like the freedom from strikes, the freedom from overly harsh press criticism, the freedom from parliamentary opposition, etc. The The Corporacion Minera de Boliva (COMIBOL) placed the following ad in the New York Times:

"The first stage /in the recent history of the Tin mines/ began in October 31, 1952, when the mines were nationalized.

"With the advent of the Military Junta /in 1964/, COMIBOL entered into the second phase of its existence. Under the Presidency of a distinguished and dynamic Bolivian Army Colonel and top management of a well-known American Engineer, this enormous mining enterprise . . . today offers an entirely new perspective.

Their main objective is to transform COMIBOL into a profitable industrial enter-

"Labor union arrogance exercised by Communists has been abolished.

"The principle of authority has been firmly established . . .

"The new economic and financial outlook offered today by COMIBOL, and the advantageous terms of Bolivia's Investment Law sanctioned by the Military Junta, have prompted foreign and local capital to boost Bolivia's mining activities . . ." In country after country in the underdeveloped world we support right-wing dictatorships of the most brutal kind; we outfit their armies, encourage U. S. businesses to invest there, underwrite their budgets, and otherwise treat them like honest and forthright partners in progress.

Of the scores of military juntas and dictators in the world, only Pakistan and Egypt can even make the excuse of using their power for economic development.

These problems are deepening, just as the hope of resolving them becomes progressively dimmer. The questions of our times are not: is America the foe of change? or, is there a need for revolution? We know the answers to these. But we must grapple with the growing gap between rich and poor countries and the lack of progress toward economic development, the increasing irrelevance of these countries to American prosperity, and the growing number of setbacks incurred by the political elements in the Third World which have been in the leadership of revolution.

The Prospects For Economic Change

The maintenance of the status quo social relations in the underdeveloped world has been achieved basically through the export of primary commodities to the industrial regions of the world. The revenues necessary for maintaining conservative regimes in power have come from taxes on revenues from these export products and from the sale of concessions for their exploitation. The dependence cannot be over-exaggerated; in Venezuela, oil revenues, which account for 92% of foreign exchange, accounted for approximately two-thirds of the 1962 national budget. The ability to import, especially to import luxury consumer goods, repay foreign loans, and otherwise "carry on" economically is hinged irrevocably to these products in these so-called hacienda-export economies. Typically this is a dependence on one or two items; in Latin America, the average proportion of export revenues derived from the country's single leading export is well over 50%. And so fluctuations in the commodity prices are of critical importance to the stability of these regimes. Coffee and sugar prices have often fluctuated by as much as 50% in one year. Moreover, there has been in the post-war era a general overall tendency to depress the prices of these commodities, a phenomenon which Raul Prebisch, in his report as Secretary-General to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCD), identified as a major cause of the increasing gap between the rich and poor nations. The United States is the leading opponent of international stabilization and regulation of commodity prices; this is partly due to a desire to protect domestic industries, and partly to our unwillingness to cut into the profits made by the American firms who do the importing, or even to pass the added costs on to American consumers. The industrialized countries generally support this policy, including, as Cuba and Romania point out, the Soviet Union, which uses the prevailing world market prices in relations

But it is the desperate need to defend the prices of traditional exports that led to the formation of what became known as the bloc of 75 at the UN trade conference in 1964. For the most part these are regimes without the slightest interest in attacking the deeper problems of land distribution, or of discouraging U. S. investment in their countries. But they recognize the increasingly marginal economic role of the Third World: while exports throughout the world rose by 7.1% form 1950-62, exports from the 3rd World rose by 3.4%. And, their share of world trade fell from 32% to 21%. And this reflects not only the deterioration in the terms of trade effecting the value of exports, but the fact that the underdeveloped countries are supplying a decreasing share of primary products as developed countries become less dependent through technological advances. And although developments such as the coffee agreement in Africa and the Latin American and Central American Free Trade Areas are admirable, they are a minor relief to the major pattern of trade relations which go between individual underdeveloped countries; between 1952 and 1960, according to UNCTD, while the value of international trade was increasing by 7.1%, the value of trade among the countries of the Third World increased 1.8%.

If the trade picture holds little prospect of easing the desperate poverty of the Third World, the vistas for industrial development can hardly be said to be hopeful. What industrial development does take place will do so against the backdrop of rapidly increasing population and labor force. By the year 2000, the population of the poor countries will more than double reaching 4 billion. New industries, especially if they are modernly equipped and if they replace more primitive labour-intensive economic activity, will not have a marked effect on employment for years to come. Thus, as has happened in the last decade, new population will have to be employed in agriculture in order to avoid starvation or it will accumulate in the slums of the cities.

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the major stumbling-block to progress in the Third World is the way inequality is so thoroughly the principle of economic structure. In the agricultural sector this is glaring.

The productivity of both land and labor are low in the Third World due to these structural considerations. The Food and Agriculture Organization, however, estimates that over half the world's population suffers from hunger or crippling malnutrition. In Latin America, only three countries can claim that more than fifty percent of their agricultural population are owners of their own land or even tenants or co-op members or workers on their own account. The extent of out-and-out peonage is further illustrated by the fact Gerasi records that in 1961 1.2% of the farms accounted for 71.6% of farm land, not counting Cuba and Bolivia. (Even counting them in, the top 1.5% of the farms account for 65% of the land.) The output on the large estates is very low. Other consequences in agrarian society of this maldistribution result from the monopoly

on political power of the oligarchy, who spend as little as possible on schools thereby perpetuating illiteracy which retards significantly any agricultural development and other social investment in health and communications. Where land reforms have been enacted, it has become imperative to supplement them with improved roads and with the distribution of agricultural equipment to the peasants, thereby revealing how underdeveloped the agricultural economy has been.

Another dramatic demonstration of the structural causes of continued poverty in the Third World -- in this case the foreign ownership of land -- is provided by the fruit trade. Latin America grows 70% of the world's bananas, and sells half of these abroad. But only a minor proportion of the profits -- under 30% -- end up in the budgets of the governments concerned; most of it is retained by United Fruit, and to a lesser extent, Standard Fruit. In addition, United Fruit owns the railroads and trolleys and shipping fleet and several ports.

The oligarchies which dominate the countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, are hardly Calvinists, reinvesting the money they earned in further development. On the contrary, Ibn Saud with his fleet of Cadillacs is the model for the poor half of the world. A very slim proportion of property income gets reinvested; the level of consumption is very high, as is the proportion of savings saved in Swiss banks. Because the governments are firmly in the hands of the rich, the highest tax a Latin American country levies on its richest income bracket is 37% (and evasion is rife).

American policy decidedly is not determined on the basis of a sympathetic response to these dilemmas. Witness the fate of Chester Bowles, who did recognize the "revolution of rising expectations"; he was given the post of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under Kennedy but was quickly sidetracked when it became clear (continued on page 6)

convention documents and the old guard

Arguments have been made by some Chicago and Ann Arbor people for the necessity of this convention to write a political document to supplant the Port Huron Statement. I understand the urgency of those who feel that SDS represents no coherent or transalatable political position. There is a need for broad political debate to occur once again. However, before the arguments are finished and the decision made in Chicago, I would like to indicate my reservations about writing such a political document at the lowa convention.

I don't believe a representative statement could be drawn. Given our diversity and size, papers should be written, published in New Left Notes, rebutting arguments printed, and debate take place in the chapters. Members would then come to the convention well grounded in the arguments to be decided. If we proceed at this convention with the papers already written, the more conservative SDS members would probably set the context of the debate. This would be perfectly acceptable if SDS meetings were known for their openess to all participants. It's no secret though, that the old guard tends to set the pace and direction of national meetings and dominate debate. Without solid preparation throughout SDS, I think once again the more established national personalities would dominate the

While traveling in the east after the last national council meeting I talked with many members who felt the Ann Arbor meeting was a failure. They commented that they felt "intimidated" by the more articulate spokesmen, and that they didn't want to speak because they didn't want to appear "stupid" in the general meetings. One very

active high school girl said, "I just didn't feel that anyone would listen to what I had to say." The national council meeting was not structured to make new people an important part of the decision making process, or bring them into the SDS community.

SDS most needs a convention where the membership can tackle the important problems concerning our future. I think we need to discuss the rationale for the existence of SDS on a national level. If we are to exist on a national level then clearly we must develop a program which gives the organization a sense of national purpose. I think we have wandered rather aimlessly being "the largest group on the New Left" for the last six months, not really harnessing our potential for much more than publishing New Left Notes and appealing for funds to keep the national office out of debt.

If SDS has an important function in bringing about change in America then we must define it, and take seriously the problems of fund raising, campus traveling and the publication of literature. It is possible that SDS should become a left wing national student association and that organizers. young adults, and ERAP projects should develop their own lines of communication and national or regional identification. That about sixty of a potential 200 plus delegates took part in the last national council meeting raises doubts that our national meetings are relevant to the membership. Though recognizing the need for a political statement, I think it's imperative that we structure this convention in a way that all delegates can become involved, develop programming, and create new forms which are closer to their local needs.

Jeff Shero

(cont) crisis in cold war ideology

his views were eccentric. Or the fate of the Alliance for Progress, not a development program at all (its small development allocations represent no increase in funds over the Eisenhower years), but an increased effort to promote financial stability though softer - lower-interest - loans in friendly countries. The capital improvements we have financed include new roads to United Fruit plantations, docks for our tankers in Venezuela's ports, etc.

The motivation behind our foreign policy is explained to a considerable extent by the needs of our economic empire. Foreign investments constitute 5% of all U.S. investment; but bring in 11% of our profits. Investments in underdeveloped countries account for 2% of all American capital at work, but 8% of profits. The Survey of Current Business of the Department of Commerce also tells us that the rate of return on investment in the 3rd World is 15% a year. Over half of our overseas investment is in the control of 45 giant corporations. In 1960, America withdrew \$1.1 billion in profits and interest from South America, and sent in \$1.0 billion in new private investment and all public lending, a net capital drain. In 1964, dealing with direct (not portfolio) investment in the whole Third World of \$13.032 billion, we invested with new Private capital and reinvested profits \$687 million in these countries, and repatriated \$2,179 million from those countries in earnings. This is not, however, a complete explanation, since the militance of our foreign policy extends throughout the world, into countries where our businessmen have little or no influence or interests.

THE DEFEAT OF NATIONALISM

The worldwide design of America is the defeat of independent forces, and this design is being carried out in the Sixties with re markable success. It was around the time that our generation came to an awareness o foreign policy - with the Bay of Pigs invasion -- that the men of power were recognizing that the real threat to U.S. interests came from the underdeveloped world, not Russia. Together with this recognition came experimentation with counter-insurgency, re-adjustment of the defense machinery to

meet limited wars, and a new political rhetoric, The Johnson Administration has relied heavily on armed forces in Vietnam, but its use of the CIA and other instruments has been extensive and effective.

There has been no tidal wave of revolution. Every style of revolutionary leadership, from the most radical Chinese-style insurgencies, to mass communist parties, to oneparty nationalist regimes, to constitutionalist reformers, have been dealt defeats at the hand of their own domestic reactionaries and American power.

Defeats for the left have taken a number of forms. They include: Foreign Armies. In Viet Nam, it is clear to everyone, the regime would not last a minute beyond the withdrawal of U. S. forces. The size of the American troop commitment has been steadily escalated to meet the need, and constitute a virtual occupying force, committed to stay there until the NLF is obliterated. The guer--illa war in the countryside has been conained, to all appearances. By their presence, South Vietnamese government forces have been freed to defeat neutralist uprisings among the students and Buddhists - a setback as well to the NLF's strategy. While in Viet-Nam, U.S. planes have been available to strafe emplacements of leftwing Pathet Lao forces in Laos, which have in the past, by virtue of coalition with neutralists, tried to keep control of the country out of the hands of the CIA-fed Gen. Nosa-

That our fighting-men are useful against the non-Communist left as well was demonstrated in the Dominican Republic, when a group of nationalist military men at the head of a constitutionalist popular revolt in the capital chased the local gorilas (apes, Latin term for junta generals) onto an island. U. S. troops along with token contingents from military regimes in Latin America kept law and order while the police forces and hoodlum squads of the old junta terrorized the left, jailing and assassinating so many on a scale so reminiscent of Trujillo (who killed over 500,000 people in his 32 years) that the countryside voted for the right-wing Presidential candidate in the hope of a return of stability.

Another military operation that succeeded was the sending of British troops to East

Africa in 1965 after the independence of Zanzibar revealed a revolutionary regime. These troops guaranteed against troop revolts in Kenya and Uganda. Mercenaries. In the case of a genuine civil war, the addition of trained foreign troops can be critically important. In the Congo, where the U. S. served as paymaster, white mercenaries put down the Simba uprising (which had a Lumumbist political flavoring) in a fierce reminder that Europeans have always out done Africans in torture and brutality.

Massacre. The worst massacre since Hitler has been perpetrated in Indonesia, against the Communists (PKI) and sympathizers. Over 500,000 lives have been taken since the October 1st. 1965 abortive Colonels uprising, which the Generals pinned on the innocent PKI. The new regime, in addition to moving toward peace with Malaysia, has declared a policy of hospitality to foreign capital. This is renewed testimony to the weaknesses of a left in an underdeveloped country where the means of violence have been built up either through external influence (like U.S. military aid) or military adventures of the regime. Other massacres have been perpetrated in the Sixties, including a similar, though smaller, Ba'athist purge of Communists in Iraq. The technique is becoming uncomfortably conventional in the modern world, used by all sides. The State Department, of course, doesn't sponsor such action. But the absence of any, even mild, disapproval for this mass murder deprives the U.S. of the right to stand on the world stage and condemn, on the basis of general humanitarian principles, the violence of parties we happen to oppose. What end could our leaders possibly imagine to justify such

Police force. Guerrilla efforts are in bad shape throughout the Third World. Any expectation (fostered by the victory of Castro against the tottering Batista rule) that the Latin American ancien regime was foredoomed should be laid to rest. In Venezuela, where 70% of the population is in cities, urban guerrillas have been turned back and forced into the hills, while leftwing Congressmen and students have been shot down in the streets. The FALN guerrillas talk of a 10-year fight. In Colombia, where U.S. Special Forces train the police, "pacification" has eliminated political bandits, and the revolutionary priest Torres has been assassinated. The same story seems to hold for Peru and Brazil. In these countries where military regimes maintain strict order, the best that can be hoped for is a kind of Political Cycle in which the left-wing Opposition alternates between open and parliamentary struggle when it can, and the building of a peasant base when urban activity is outlawed.

Bloody guerrilla wars are taking place in Portuguese Africa at the present time, but the chance of victory for the Africans has been diminished by the establishment of an independent racist regime in Rhodesia, and the new legitimacy of Apartheid in Southwest Africa. In other countries where guerrilla movements have the strength of long struggle (that is a partial explanation of the tenacity of the NLF in Vietnam), such as Guatemala and Philippines, the regimes are under some strain.

Local military coups. One of the chiefs of the U.S. military mission in Uruguay told John Gerassi: "Don't worry. The new Uruguayan army has been well indoctrinated, especially the officers. Whatever they do, if they seize power, they'll be with us. When I first came here, I was very depressed about the army. The boys looked like a bunch of boys, and they didn't give a damn about what the government was doing. Now they care enough to keep it in line . . . That's my doing, in part at least."

U.S. foreign policy has been well served by the officers of three continents. Coups have displaced more than a dozen independent nationalist regimes, some elected and some personal regimes representing the movement that ended colonialism in those countries. If the early sixties were a period of exuberant assertion of "positive neutralism"-- the activist of nonaligned nations meddling against the Cold War -- the late sixties seem to be the defeat of the first generation of nationalist leadership.

In Ghana, Nkurmah has fallen, and his regime's corruption is being exposed every day. Independent foreign policies have been wiped out in Latin America, with the fall of Quadros and then Goulart from coups in Brazil, and the coups in Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina. Ben Bella has fallen from a coup at the hands of Gen. Boumedienne. Other military juntas have succeeded neutralist regimes in Dahomey, Congo (Brazzaville), and Rwanda. The coups in the Middle East have been too numerous to follow; while Socialist regimes have been displaced, and Nasser has been isolated in Egypt.

Although the most notable Nationalist authoritarian regimes have proved more vulnerable than would have been expected, other styles have not fared any better. Atempts to gain power through electoral means have been thwarted in a number of countries: in Guyana, the British gerrymandered the legislature and stirred up inter-racial hostility to deprive Cheddi Jagan of a chance to rule. In Chile, where illiterates cannot vote, the Socialist-Communist electoral alliance failed to elect Allende to the Presidency in a two-way 1964 contest with the Christian Democrat Frei, backed by right-wing money.

The upshot of all these defeats is that the militant wing of the Organization of African Unity is now composed of Guinea, Tanzania, and Mali, almost alone. Of the six regimes that voted abstentions on the American proposal to eject Cuba from the OAS, four have fallen to military coups, leaving only Chile and Mexico with an independent foreign policy. Of the first generation of nationalist leaders, only Nasser, Toure, and Castro remain. One minimal condition for the attractiveness of a model is success, and alternatives to China and the American Way become fewer and fewer as time goes by.

One group of nations has been paraded by American liberals as a genuine alternative: it includes India, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, and sometimes Formosa and Japan. Formosa, of course, is a dictatorship. Japan is a developed country, where the old elite took the leadership in economic development. In India, Venezuela, and Puerto Rico, however, local capital has been subordinated to foreign capital. In Venezuela since 1957 a Social-Democratic banner flies from a regime that obeys the dictates of the coalition between foreign oil interests and the local oligarchy. In Puerto Rico and India there is, by contrast, a great deal of industrial development, but this is controlled by foreign investors. In India local capitalists originally objected and had to be kept in line by the Government. In all three countries development is lopsided in the direction of high and fast profits, and social spending remains low.

The late sixties may well be a new period of defeat for the radicals throughout the world. In the early fifties, when America was in a period of frigidity, things were "closing down" as well in Russia; these developments fed on each other. Then Hungary, Nasser, Montgomery, Alabama, the Soviet thaw, and a number of other developments forced the world open to change. The possibilities for change in America are related to the fortunes of popular forces in the Third World. This relationship is not the romantic hope held by some American "leftists" of an anti-imperialist world, led by China, surrounding and isolating America, the citadel of world reaction. Rather, it is a complementary relationship; many of the enemies are the same, and many of the issues are parallel. A major unanswered question is the real dependence of American corporate enterprise on foreign investment opportunities; a deeper understanding of that complex subject might give some direction to our strategy.

The failure to develop economic independence and the failure to maintain political independence also indicate that the next generation of radicals will have to make a more fundamental assessment of economic power-relationships. It has been primarily American efforts that have narrowed the range of choices open to developing countries. To restrain American rapaciousness must continue to be the first aim of our efforts; but secondly, we want to press for a foreign policy of encouragement to popular rule and economic development.

letting the people decide

It is said that we are attempting to build "community" as the first level of action; later we are to link these "communities" in increasing numbers to bring about a democratic society in which people through "participatory democracy" are given once again power over their lives: theirs is to decide. Having had power returned to them they are thus reborn as human beings and cease to exist as statistics, objects, things, numbers, etc. At this point we supposedly have created a "good society." Now, I believe a great deal of work is going to have to go into a more detailed and explanatory rendition of our values and goals before we can be taken seriously as a social force. But at this stage of the game it is not really necessary to worry ourselves to death about this, for we are just barely on the launching pad, and I see no reason to drop all our tools and thoughts on how to build a successful method to get to the goal we each may desire, for the purpose of creating a wild and possibly mistaken idea as to what we will want when (if) we get there.

I prefer to allow events and the people to build and mold the "movement" rather than set up a program around which we are religious ideologists to accept, the people are just not interested in the struggle for ideology; they want something more tangible, material and of use today. I have little doubt that if we allow ourselves to be drawn into an over-concern of academicism and intellectuality, we will have gotten ahead of ourselves, and will face the consequences of losing contact with the people. Many if not most of the Ideologists today have and show contempt for the very people they desire to lead. If our goal is to become a political sect and to glory in our "correctness," to sit around in small groups and

retell each other how "moral," "right" and "just" we are, then let us get to it. It's a well traveled path for those on the Left and will not be difficult to find. Of course, we will be isolated and irrelevant, but to the Left wing equist it will be self rewarding.

Our critics on the Lett, in calling for "theoretical clarity" should be listened to when they say we should be more positive; the question has merit. Correct or incorrect as the case may be, to carry on self-examination and to question one's goals will increase the chances of their correctness, at least in the minds of the beholders. We should examine all our critics' arguments. even those from the moderate right. However, constructive criticism is one thing and ideological polemics is another. And in this latter group, I would place such as those who tell us that we speak in a manner befitting the term "Twaddle" and who proclaim themselves willing to save us from ourselves. These gentlemen come not to discuss but to tell and for us they have advice in a neve ending stream. Yet what do they offer us? And please note that "us" for they are not speaking to the people; they are speaking to us. They separate us from the people. Why are we better? Theirs is an effort to create a political movement to advance their beliefs, their desires for the people. They don't desire to become of the people; theirs is to lead, the people's but to follow. Our would-be Messiah's are ever willing to lead, but how does this differentiate them from their Right wing brothers? In their own way they are similar, too, and promote their own brand of conservatism. If our motto be "Let the people decide" let us stick to it.

Ronnie Somerlott Colville, Washington

Paul Booth N.C. at-Large

electoral politics: chicago cip

A meeting called by the 49th Ward Committee for Independent Political Action on July 17 voted unanimously to form the Citizens Independent Party in Illinois' 10th Senatorial and Assembly District. The group, meeting in the Club Room of the Rogers Park Hotel, adopted a platform and slated two candidates for the November elections. Those nominated were Arthur Vazauez for State Senator and Kathleen Kearney for State Representative. Both are residents of

The new party seeks to address itself to two major problems facing voters in Chicago. First is the inability of the established political powers to provide adequate and constructive alternatives to the war in Vietnam, the grinding urban poverty which finds its only expression in social disorders, and the problems of racism and discrimination. Second is the total inability of ordinary people to participate in government and in making the decisions which affect their lives because of machine politics and the concentration of enormous power in the hands of fewer and fewer people.

The Citizens Independent Party further feels it important to take a stand on national and foreign policy issues as well as state and local problems, not only because local and national problems are intimately related, but also because it is local politicians who turn out the votes which support national parties and their programs. The CIP candidates will challenge their opponents to

tell the voters just where they stand on such issues as the war in Vietnam. The crises facing America are too serious to let the politicians get away with their usual platitudes this fall.

Vazquez-Kearney Campaign Headquarters will be located at the offices of 49th Ward CIPA at 1236 W. Devon.

PLATFORM OF THE 10th Dist. CITIZENS INDEPENDENT PARTY

FOREIGN POLICY

- 1. Renounce America's policy of unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and reaffirm our support for the right of people everywhere to determine their own forms of government.
- 2. End the war in Vietnam and bring American troops home. Negotiate directly with the National Liberation Front for internationally supervised free elections.
- 3. Support an expanded and strengthened United Nations, cease all military assistance to dictatorships, and redirect foreign aid to the building of free and prosperous socie-
- 4. Establish diplomatic relations with all countries, curb the influence of American corporations on American foreign policy, and support the right of foreign countries to national sovereignty over foreign invest-
- 5. Take advantage of the decreased international tensions that would result from a

new American foreign policy to press for a genuine international agreement on dis-

NATIONAL POLICY

- 1. The people who live in our society should participate in the social, economic, and political decisions which affect their lives and the lives of their children.
- 2. Reallocate our national priorities and finance a real war on poverty, slums, disease, and ignorance by diverting funds from our \$60,000,000,000.00 war budget.
- 3. Reduce federal tax rates by closing loopholes for high income brackets and initiating progressive corporate and capital gains
- 4. Extend federal labor legislation and social security benefits to agricultural workers and workers in other inter-state industries not presently covered.
- 5. Define "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in the war on poverty as meaning a minimum of 51% on all war on poverty advisory boards. Take administration and control of war on poverty money out
- 6. Repeal all anti-labor sections of the Kennedy-Landrum-Griffin Act and the Taft-Hartley Act (particularly section 14b).
- 7. Enact a \$2.00 an hour minimum wage and assert the right (not privilege) of every family to a minimum guaranteed annual in-

- 8. No wage increase restrictions from government without corporate profit restrictions. Take wage increases from corporate profits, not the consumer's pocket.
- 9. Social planning now for automation to prevent future unemployment and to allow all to share the wealth of increased produc-
- 10. Extend compulsory medical insurance (Medicare) to all citizens and enact a progressive tax scale for the social security
- 11. Integrate public schools as directed by the Supreme Court in 1954, and initiate a policy of enforcing federal voting rights legislation.
- 12. Protect the consumer through federal truth in packaging and truth in lending legis-
- 13. Assert our commitment to freedom and civil liberties through repeal of the McCarran Act and the Emergency Detention Act, by the abolition of HUAC, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, and all travel bans, and by placing military justice under the review of civilian courts.
- 14. Restructure the draft system to eliminate social inequity and provide for those who object to specific wars on reasons of conscience or higher law. Seek the eventual termination of compulsory conscription.
- 15. Guarantee independent and minor party political candidates equal access to all

regarding war crimes

At the risk of repeating something which has already been suggested....How's chances of getting a note (letter) to North Vietnam-FAST.

Why? To ask (or plead, if necessary) the North Vietnamese not to try the fliers as war criminals.

Why not?

1) because it will bring on one of two military repercussions: either the U.S. will attack Vietnam (North) in division strength or we will bomb the dikes, and, although we all realize the propaganda victory of a war criminal trial-is it worth the rape of North Vietnam? Must the war mongers be given

2) the trials, if properly handled by the press to the fullest advantage, could easily arouse enough public sentiment to kill (or at least badly wound) the peace movement in this country.

Damn it, Jane, this is the excuse the administration is looking for (coupled with China's promise of sanctuary for North Vietnam air and logistic bases) to squash us, North Vietnam and bring China into

Are several trials and their propaganda value worth the stakes? Can we at least send one letter to try and stop consequences which will undoubtedly outweigh the victory? Am I clear off base?

Don Sutton 139 N. 12 Lincoln, Nebraska

It is a fact today that American air force people are being ordered to bomb North and South Vietnam and that they are carrying out such orders just as the Nazi pilots did in bombing cities that Hitler's government attacked.

American airmen who do such things are as guilty of war crimes as the German airmen were, and I can see no reason why they should not be tried for their crimes.

A trial is necessary in order to assemble all the facts and make them known to people everywhere.

Nevertheless it would do no good to punish those men for their crimes. Should they be proven guilty and convicted, the only human way of dealing with them would be to forgive them and offer them some possibility of making amends for the death and suffering which they have caused.

To treat American war criminals in a humane way would also make it difficult for the United States government to further escalate the war with the trials as a pretext.

Furthermore such trials could help to establish the greater guilt of other officials in the American government who are ordering and condoning air attacks against help-

Those officials ought also to be put on trial for their crimes either now in absentia, or personally as soon as they can be apprehended.

Sincerely,

Art Rosenblum - National Office Staff P.S. I would agree with the author of the previous letter that S.D.S. should try to make its views known to the Hanoi government.

The possible execution of four United States airmen by the North Vietnamese government has been handled by the administration and by the press as a crucial turningpoint in the war in Vietnam. Partially to justify its bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, partially to pave the way for bombings of the Red River dykes and, perhaps, China, and partially to silence the peace movement and other dissenters, the administration is conducting an incredibly effective propaganda campaign to project the image that this execution represents a significant escalation of the war by Hanoi, justifying increased escalation on the pat of the U.S.

I think SDS and other elements of the peace movement must respond to this campaign quickly and effectively. We must point out that this issue is a false issue, that it is only a diversion from discussion of the real issues of the war, a camouflage to must ask, what are American airmen doing over North Vietnam in the first place, or, for that matter, over South Vietnam

Unless we respond, we allow the administration to delegitimatize our protest and to prepare the American public for more escalation. Unless we respond, we will lose much of the "fringe" support which has helped us in the past, as indicated by the Congressional statement on the projected execution.

I suggest that SDS chapters immediately respond to the administration's campaign, by calling press conferences, issuing statements to the establishment, and explaining the issues in our own publications. Since the second International Days of Protest, we have experienced a real isolation from the vehicles of mass communication in this country. But it is important that we now try to utilize them as best we can and by whatever means possible.

It is clear that the administration's predictions of new escalation are self-fulfilling prophecies. Although we are cut off from most of the media of response, I am convinced that we must try to point out the real significance of this false issue; otherwise, we will be seriously weakened and effectively iso-

Dena Clamage 1172 W. Hancock, #14 Detroit, Mich. 48201

arrest 4 sdsers

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

Minneapolis police broke up a street rally against the war in Vietnam and arrested seven demonstrators, four of whom were SDS members, on July 16. The rally was broken up because there was no American flag displayed and a city ordinance requires a 3 x 5 American flag on a 9 ft. pole at all meetings of more than 10 people.

The rally was sponsored by the Minnesota Committee to End the War in Vietnam. It began at 7:00 p.m. at 7th Street and Hennepin Ave., a busy intersection in downtown Minneapolis. Around 7:30 after three speakers, including University of Minnesota SDS chairman Lee Smith, had addressed a group of about 25 Committee members and 75 onlookers, Minneapolis Police Chief Calvin Hawkinson walked up to Committee chairman Larry Seigle and put him under arrest.

You are under arrest," Hawkinson said to Seigle, "You have to have a flag." Seigle told the cop, "We have a flag across the street" (Socialist Workers Party headquarters). "Can we go get it?" The chief said no and Seigle was dragged away to a squad car. Then cops began arbitrarily arresting obscure real questions about the war. We demonstrators, mostly those with signs or leaflets. A girl who was climbing the ladder being used for a platform to speak was dragged down by two cops who proceeded to wrestle her around.

The crowd began to shout "Leave her alone! Leave her alone!" and the cops arrested Committee member James Krahn, although they released the girl. The cops then arrested SDS member Keith Ruona, a worker on the Minneapolis Community Union Project. Ruona went limp and was dragged to a squad

When this happened, SDS member Roger Hagon shouted, "Come on! Who's going with the people that are arrested?" and began to cross the street. His wife, Mary Kay Hagon followed him and so did chapter chairman. Lee Smith. "We've got room for all of you,"

In the meantime the cops arrested Joe Johnson, the "Man Without A Country" and Socialist Workers Party candidate for the U.S. Senate from Minnesota, who had been scheduled to speak to the rally.

The seven were booked and fingerprinted, as well as photographed. James Krahn, Mary Kay Hagon and Keith Ruona all made contacts with persons against the war during the approximate hour they were in jail.

All seven have been released on personal recognizance to Lynn Castner, executive director of the Minnesota Civil Liberties

At the time this is being written, it is not known whether the MCLU Board will decide to represent the seven or not. They scheduled for a court appearance July 18.

As I read the news, both Russian and American, I see the escalation of the war in Vietnam being answered from Hanoi by continual refusals to accept outside manpower help. Since the D.R.V. is up against the richest war machine in the world and yet continues to struggle without Chinese or Russian soldiers, it is obvious that they are going to keep their side free from foreign

I cringe at the thought of these people going unsupported into the total war that the U.S. machine will wage upon them. I propose that S.D.S. sponsor a drive to send food and clothing to the D.R.V. in order to counter the massiveness of the U.S.'s aggression. This drive is not to be seen as support for the war, but as support for humanity. Critics of the New Left may ask why we

are giving aid only to the North Vietnamese if our goal is the preservation of life, and not an act that is mainly political. The answer is simple. We cannot hope to counter the massiveness of the comforts assured the American soldier (brothels, etc. -- although we would not want to give the D.R.V. in the name of humanity, similar institutions), but we can help. This can be CARE package type of campaign. (CARE stands for Cooperative for American Relief Everywherethat is everywhere except where we are murdering people). Maybe we can contact the D.R.V.'s Red Cross in order to coordinate the program.

I would like to see discussion of the problems involved and maybe offers of help in getting the program started if itgets approv-

Dennis Brown

On June 24th, the National Farm Workers Association and the Teamster Union moved into open conflict at the ranches of the Di-Giorgio Corporation in Delano and Borrego Springs. The confrontation took the form of a crudely fraudulent election among the current employees of the firm.

NFWA and Digiorgio representatives had met on June 20th to discuss the details for an election procedure, but the Corporation then announced on Wednesday that elections would take place in 48 hours under its own terms. The terms stipulated that no employees on strike would be eligible to vote, that FWA and AWOC representatives could not talk to the employees on the properties of the firm, that the votes would be counted by an accounting firm retained by DiGiorgio, and that balloting would be in the camp headquarters guarded by police.

Only in agriculture could such a "victory for democracy" be taken seriously. The farm workers, excluded from collective bargaining legislation, have no legal machinery to force the company to deal with its striking employees. The solution that had been proposed by Governor Brown and DiGiorgio some time ago, which would have brought in the State Conciliation Service, was rejected by the unions because it would have forced compulsory arbitration on the FWA -- and forced it to call off the strike and the boycott of S & W, Treesweet, and Sun Vista products before talks began.

NFWA organizers have been secretly meeting with many of the strikebreakers at the Sierra Vista and Borrego ranches for several months. Instead of calling upon these workers to join those on strike, the FWA has attempted to build a base of support within the camps. The growing success of FWA in building such a "fifth column" was beginning to panic the DiGiorgios, and the company invited the Teamsters Union in to head off that fifth column. The Teamsters passed out leaflets which crudely threatened that if FWA won the election, the workers would be forced to do civil rights activity and leave their families to go on long marches. The union instead promised a guaranteed minimum wage and the right to work long hours to get a decent paycheck every day. As the basis for a sweetheart contract, the Teamster leaflets should remain a classic model for some time to come.

On the day before the election, FWA members along with about 80 student volunteers, distributed leaflets in Delano and the surrounding communities attacking the elections as a fraud and calling on the community to picket the elections. On Friday at six in the morning over 300 persons arrived at the road near the camp headquarters on the Sierra Vista Ranch.

As the buses carrying the workers began to arrive at the poll, the crowd yelled, "No voten! Don't be afraid," while organizers and priests used megaphones to explain to the FWA supporters in the buses why the elections were being boycotted. There was confusion, then realization, and finally smiles of recognition from the workers. A red flag was waved determinedly from several of the buses. Most of the workers refused to get off the bus - others did. There was a large group of Anglo highschool scabs who sported a Teamster placard and snickered at the attention they were getting. There were the old, pathetic scabs like the man who boasted to the pickets that he had voted twice for the Teamsters.

Every secretary, carpenter, plumber and driver who worked on the ranch filed through the polls. Another local grower reportedly brought a few of his "boys" over to send them through the back door to vote.

DiGiorgio had announced that 730 employees were eligible to vote. Of these, 281 voted for the Teamsters, 20 voted no union 40 cast blank ballots (which FWA had asked supporters who were afraid not to vote to do instead of staying on the bus), and a few voted for the FWA and AWOC. The success of the boycott was obvious. In Borrego Springs (between San Diego and El Centro) the boycott was even more effective.

The fraudulent elections will be investigated, but it must be remembered that DiGiorgio can not be prevented by court action from signing with the Teamsters. Only the success of the S & W Boycott across the United States and direct action and pressure against the Teamster bosses can win the fight now.

-Walt Sheashy

sf regional lit list

Updated June 27, 1966

ABOUT SDS

) SDS Constitution

SDS Chapter Constitution--sample) 25¢ - America and the New Era--30 page analysis of American society (approved by June, 1965 SDS Convention) - bulk

SDS membership cards

Introduction to SDS--4 pages - bulk) Port Huron Statement-64 page manifesto of values, beliefs) 15¢ - SDS Chapter Organizer's Handbook, Jack Kittredge

() 10¢ - Guide to Conscientious Objection--12 pages of detailed information about conscientious objection and Form 150 Classification Procedure for CO's--outline of SS classification procedures,

one page - bulk

) 10¢ - Immigration to Canada as an Alternative to the Draft - bulk) Alternatives to the Draft - bulk

) 10¢ - The Intellectual as an Agent of Social Change, Potter - bulk

10¢ - The Care and Feeding of Power Structures, Jack Minnis - bulk)10¢ - Political Framework of Decision-Making, A course syllabus, Philip Green - bulk

10¢ - Sunday Seminar Series Bib., (Democracy, Economy, Etc.) - bulk) 10g - "The End of Ideology" as Ideology, Alan Haber - bulk

) 10¢ - Students and Economic Action, Carl Wittman - bulk

10¢ - Suggestions for a Study of Your Hometown, Robert Lamb - bulk 10¢ - Research and Education in Community Action Projects, Paul Potter bulk

) 10¢ - Finding and Making Leaders, Nicholas Van Hoffman - bulk

) 10¢ - The New Radical Encounters the University, Paul Potter - bulk

Free Speech Movement Goes to High School, Frank Harper - bulk

10¢ - University Reform Bib., Ralph Haplan - bulk

) 10¢ - Student Social Action, Tom Hayden - bulk

) 25¢-Wind in the Fields--a report on California farm labor

) 10¢ - Grape Strike Report No. 1, Norm Potter

) 10¢ - Churches and the War, Lee Webb - bulk 10¢- Let us shape the Future--speech given by Carl Oglesby at the November

27, 1965 March on Washington - bulk

) 10¢ - Vietnam: Any Way Out?, Christopher Hobsen - bulk

10¢ - Vietnam Study Guide and Annotated Bib., S. Rosenthal - bulk

) Notes on Arguing about Vietnam, Todd Gitlin

ECONOMICS

)10¢ - Bibliography on the American Economy, Lee Webb - bulk)10¢ - Whose Welfare? Notes on Poverty and the Welfare State, Bob Ross

() Information on the Involvement of US Corporations in So. Africa

) \$1 - Studies on the Left--May-June, 1966

)50¢ - Viet Report--August-Sept., October, Nov.-Dec., 1965)50¢ - Liberation--Nov., Dec., 1965 and March, Summer, 1966

(50% discount on bulk orders. We can supply any quantity of items marked bulk". Bulk orders on other pamphlets can be handled if not needed immediately.)

SDS Regional Office

924 Howard Street

San Francisco, Calif. 94103

City State Zipcode

our selfish interests

Unlike lesser men, young leftist intellectuals are not the products of social and economic conditions. Or so one might conclude from Paul Booth's finding of "committment" rather than "self-interest" as our main motivation (NLN June 17) - "even though our analysis tells us that our society can only be redeemed by people coming out of apathy to go to the roots of their own common

Well, no doubt I'm the worst opportunist on the left, but I derive areat personal satisfaction from radical action. Like getting even with the rich for my childhood poverty, or with cops for my brutal father. And the opportunity of working 60 hours for \$20 weekly as a professional radical seems a veritable featherbed compared with the humiliating prostitution of a real-world job.

Admission of self-interest embarrasses political groups, hence Republicans claim they are helping everyone else, etc. But Negroes and unions come out front, because they know their strength depends on their own peers. Ours, such as it is, depends on college students and racial minorities (Negroes, farm workers, slums). Not on the mass media, nor on middle-aged "progressives" and liberals, nor on the AFL-CIO. Would our real friends be shocked if we were more honest?

The nitty-gritty here is the Beatnik Question: "alienated youth culture". Booth sets. up a symbolic dichotomy between pot and politics. Again, "a personal outlet in LSD, or a political outlet for the same disaffec tions in SDS. "Mutually exclusive alterna-

But really, rather few people devote themselves entirely to work or solely to play. Specialization and professionalization of

SDS member probably combines several activities in a personal curriculum. Pot and politics, school and sex.

Now that black leaders are suggesting we've overstayed our welcome as organizers of their masses, we white students may eventually find a little time for our selfish concerns. Like university reform, which ranks pretty low on the present agenda. And resistance to political suppression of sex and "drugs". These would be secondary issues for the Movement, on which only a few persons would specialize, but they should be accepted as legitimate student goals.

> Jefferson Poland SDS and Sexual Freedom League

fraternal organization

THE METHODIST STUDENT MOVEMENT

During the last six years the nationwide focus of the Methodist Student Movement has shifted from one of introspection on the meaning of the Church and the Christian faith, to a growing clarity that the Church is only authentic as it participates in the processes of building a just society where men can realize their humanness. The MSM is beginning to face the political reality that if we are really serious about creating new structures and values in this country, then we must be radically intentional about developing corporate goals and strategies to implement those goals; moreover, we are seeking to ally ourselves with other groups whose goals and commitments are similar to ours. Aside from the issues of strategy we are raising several questions which seem equally important; namely, (1) how to develop a corporate discipline that keeps us faithful to our commitments to social change; (2) how to create countervailing powers and use that power responsibly; and (3) how to protect our own power structures from the same perversions of the old ones.

National Convention CLEARLAKE, **IOWA**

August 27th To Sept. 21st

nac minutes

(continued from page 3)

Banks in New York which is being organized by the American Committee on Africa, this being in harmony with past SDS policy.

9. Weissman to contact Illinois ACLU on new HUAC proposal.

10. Report on the response of the NIC on Bettina Aptheker's proposal for a student strike (for text of proposal see NLN July 22, 1966). The NIC was unanimously opposed to signing and supporting the proposal at this time. The general feeling was that decisions on program should be reserved until there is discussion at the August N. C. meeting. (See article on discussion of NIC members.)

11. It was decided that the NAC should refrain from making policy decisions, this being the function of the NIC.

> Minutes submitted by Paul Le Blanc

Second-Class postage rates paid in

NEW LEFT NOTES Room 206 1608 W. Madison Chicago, Ill. 60612 Return Requested

Chicago, Illinois

J. Walton Senterfitt 2115 S St. NW Washington, DC 20008